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PROMOTING RATIONAL LAND USE
PLANNING: THE MUNICIPAL
INCORPORATION STATUTE AS A
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
IMPLEMENTATION DEVICE
The orderly growth of any city is achieved in direct proportion
to its willingness to plan for that growth. Just as Rome was not
built in a day, nor the Appian Way completed overnight, so a
city will not be able to achieve totality in its planning activities
from the rising to the setting of a single sun. The word 'plan'
connotes longevity of time. We must ever plan for the future.t
In the early 1920's, the United States Department of
Commerce promulgated the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
(SZEA)1 which authorizes local governments to enact land use
regulations and zoning ordinances "in accordance with a
comprehensive plan."'2 Although the comprehensive plan has come
to be widely recognized as a viable tool for land use planning,3
local zoning regulations, an initial means of controlling land use,
originally met with some resistance.4 Indeed, in Village of Euclid
t E. YOKLEY, LAW OF SUBDIVISIONS § 10, at 36 (2d ed. 1981).1 ADVISORY COMM'N ON CITY PLANNING & ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A
STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3 (rev. ed. 1926) [hereinafter cited as SZEA].
2 Id.; see 1981 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK § 7.01, at 95 (F. Strom ed. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]; Larsen & Siemon, "In Accordance With A Comprehensive
Plan"-The Myth Revisited, 1979 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 105, 106; infra
notes 16 & 21 and accompanying text. Prepared for the purpose of satisfying the demand
for municipal zoning, the SZEA "constitutes a general delegation of power to a community
(city or county) to regulate and control the use of property in zoning districts established by
ordinance or resolution." 1 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 1-4, at 6 (4th ed. 1978).
As of 1974, 47 states had enacted some form of a state zoning enabling act. See
Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1435 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Zoning].
3 See infra notes 28, 49-50 and accompanying text.
4 Zoning, supra note 2, at 1435; see, e.g., Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 327-28, 130 P.
828, 831 (1913) (property "owner has the right to erect such buildings covering such
portions [of his property] as he chooses, and put his property, as thus improved, to any
legitimate use which suits his pleasure, provided that in so doing he does not imperil or
threaten harm to others"); Calvo v. City of New Orleans, 136 La. 480, 482, 67 So. 338, 339
(1915) (the exercise of the police power does not encompass the aesthetic), overruled, 154
La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923); Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 309-12, 128 A. 50, 60-61
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v. Ambler Realty Co.,5 the zoning power was challenged as an
unconstitutional exercise of the municipality's police power.'
Removing any doubt as to the constitutional validity of the local
government's power to regulate land use, the Supreme Court
declared that the power to zone emanates from the expanding
police power of the state.7 Given their virtual free reign over
zoning and land use decisions,8 local governments soon recognized
that their authority could be exercised for the benefit of the
community, albeit oftentimes to the simultaneous disadvantage of
state or regional concerns.0
In the exercise of this broad power, the residents of a
particular area in an existing town may incorporate as a separate
governmental entity,10 and irrespective of the residual effect upon
the surrounding areas, enact measures designed to protect and
(1925).
8 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Id. at 386-87.
7 Id. at 387. The Euclid Court upheld the constitutionality of a municipality's exercise
of its police power to enact and enforce a zoning ordinance which restricted the plaintiff's
use of his land. Id. at 390. The Court indicated that it would not hesitate to defer to the
judgment of local legislatures in the zoning area, declaring that "[ilf the validity of the
legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment
must be allowed to control." Id. at 388. The Court further noted, however, that the
municipality's exercise of its zoning power must be consistent with the general welfare. Id.
at 390.
1 See Bagne, The Parochial Attitudes of Metropolitan Government: An Argument to a
Regional Approach to Urban Planning and Development, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 271, 280
(1978). The broad power provided to local governments under the SZEA, together with the
judicial deference afforded the exercise of such authority, give localities virtual free reign
over zoning and land use decisions. See id. at 280.
9 See Vestal, Government Fragmentation in Urban Areas, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 155,
155-56 (1971). Local governments may wield their power over land use in order to achieve
exclusionary goals. See, e.g., Crow v. Brown, 457 F.2d 788, 789 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
In Crow, the court held that a county's zoning policies and its denial of building permits for
the construction of low-cost apartments constituted a violation of the equal protection
clause. Id. at 790. The Fifth Circuit noted that although whites were "fleeing" to
unincorporated areas on the outskirts of Atlanta, rising costs were forcing black residents to
move into the inner city. Id. at 789 (quoting Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 385 (N.D. Ga.
1971)). The court then endorsed the district court's prediction that "[w]ithin the immediate
future, unless drastic changes occur, it is not merely possible but certain that Atlanta will
become, in essence, a black city with a solid white perimeter." 457 F.2d at 789 (quoting
Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 385 (N.D. Ga. 1971)); see infra notes 133-36 and
accompanying text.
1" See generally C. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LocAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS § 26.13, at
736-37 (1980) (a municipality has the potential ability to legislate to maintain the status quo
in the area). For a discussion of the various reasons why a community may choose to
incorporate, see infra notes 66-84 and accompanying text.
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preserve parochial interests.11 These "defensive incorporations,"
while inuring to the benefit of the new municipality, also may serve
to disrupt or destroy the implementation of any comprehensive
plan that may be in effect in the town or region in which the new
municipality is located.12 It would appear, therefore, that a
regional or community land use planning scheme, of which the
comprehensive plan is an integral part, may be compromised by
such incorporations.13
In an attempt to promote rational and orderly land use
planning, this Note initially will focus upon the comprehensive
plan itself and the power of government entities to implement such
plans. The Note then will examine the reasons for a community's
incorporation and the governmental fragmentation spawned by the
attractiveness of municipal status. After considering the
incorporation statute as a method of plan implementation, the
Note proffers a model statute which is designed to preclude the
phenomenon of "defensive incorporation" and to promote the
effective implementation of comprehensive plans. Following an
analysis of the legislative and judicial roles in land use planning,
the Note will conclude that until a state-wide planning program
which includes a substantive incorporation statute is effected, the
courts should accord substantial weight to such a program existing
on the local level, even though "home rule" is compromised in
furtherance of "regional general welfare."
THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
The Origin and Meaning of the Comprehensive Plan
The SZEA's delegation of authority to local governments was
designed to enable a locality to regulate land use for the "health,
safety, morals or. . .general welfare of the community."' 4 One of
" See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 1974)
(new municipality enacts ordinance designed to prevent the construction of multifamily
dwelling units), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
. ,2 See Marcus v. Baron, 84 App. Div. 2d 118, 123, 445 N.Y.S.2d 587, 592 (2d Dep't
1981); Ramapo, N.Y., [1967] N.Y. Local Laws 1909 (No. 3).
13 See Vestal, supra note 9, at 155, 174 (governmental fragmentation prevents injection
of regional considerations into local decisionmaking).
14 SZEA, supra note 1, § 1. As a broad delegation of authority, the SZEA permits a
local government to act for "the full inventory of constitutionally permissible pur-
poses-promotion of health, safety, morals, and general welfare-but the purely local public
interest was dominant." MODEL LAND DEV. CODE art. 1 commentary at 2-3 (1976).
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the few guidelines set forth in the SZEA as to the proper exercise
of this authority is that the zoning must be effected "in accordance
with a comprehensive plan.' 1 5 Since the concept of long-range
planning and the power to zone were not rationally linked when
the SZEA was promulgated, and because the draftsmen of the Act
failed to define the meaning of "comprehensive plan," such lan-
guage became a fertile source of confusion."' Indeed, many courts
equated zoning with the comprehensive plan itself.' Thus, if. a
zoning ordinance was comprehensive and well-planned, the ordi-
nance would be held to satisfy the requirement.18 Additional con-
fusion was engendered by the Commerce Department's promulga-
tion of another model enabling statute, the Standard City
Planning Enabling Act (SPEA),' 9 which authorized the adoption of
a "master plan '20 but neglected to relate this concept to the
"5 See Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation,
74 MICH. L. REV. 899, 902 (1976). The enabling acts adopted by the states contained few
substantive provisions to guide local land use decisionmaking. Id. at 951. Furthermore, al-
though zoning regulations have to comply with an existing comprehensive plan, the content,
goals, and form of such plan were not clearly prescribed in the SZEA. Id.; see Cunningham,
Land-Use Control-The State and Local Programs, 50 IOWA L. REV. 367, 383-84 (1965).
" See Tarlock, Consistency With Adopted Land Use Plans as a Standard of Judicial
Review: The Case Against, 9 URB. L. ANN. 69, 73 n.13 (1975). Although not expressed as
such in the SZEA, the comprehensive plan requirement of that Act was viewed as an at-
tempt to prevent arbitrary zoning by local governments. See 1 E. YOKLEY, supra note 2, § 5-
2, at 214. In stressing the importance of the comprehensive plan, Yokley analogizes that
"[tihe comprehensive plan has relationship to legal and proper zoning as does the balance
staff to the proper operation of a watch. Without the balance staff, we have no watch, and,
by the same token, without the comprehensive plan we have no zoning." Id. at 216. Some
courts, however, have not shared Yokley's enthusiasm for the importance of the plan, rea-
soning that it merely serves an advisory function in land use planning. See infra notes 33-39
and accompanying text. See generally Bagne, supra note 8, at 280-81 (the absence of guide-
lines as to the meaning of the phrase "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" resulted in
delegation of the interpretative task to local governments and courts, notwithstanding that
the meaning "was often beyond the ken of most judges and perhaps the passers of the
[SZEA] itself in the respective states").
'7 E.g., Mott's Realty Corp. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 152 Conn. 535, 537, 209
A.2d 179, 180, (1965); Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 165, 131 A.2d 1, 7-
8 (1957); see Haar, "In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARv. L. REV. 1154,
1157 (1955); Larsen & Siemon, supra note 2, at 118-21.
18 See, e.g., Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 165, 131 A.2d 1, 7-8
(1957); infra notes 33 & 36 and accompanying text.
19 ADVISORY COMM'N ON CITY PLANNING & ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STAND-
ARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING AcT (1928) [hereinafter cited as SPEA]. Although the SPEA
was more specific than the SZEA insofar as it discussed the various planning devices that
could be utilized by a municipality, it set forth neither the underlying plan policies nor the
ways in which the various devices could be used in combination. See HANDBOOK, supra note
2, § 7.01, at 95-96; Mandelker, supra note 15, at 952.
20 The SPEA authorized the municipality's adoption of a "master plan" designed to
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SZEA's comprehensive plan.21
Notwithstanding this semantic quagmire, the comprehensive
plan has been defined as "an independent, long-term plan for use
and development of land .... It is to be distinguished from
zoning, which is merely one of the tools by which the plan may be
implemented.23 One commentator has observed that "[t]ogether,
zoning and planning work to provide a coordinated, adjusted and
harmonious development of a community in accordance with a
comprehensive plan. '24 Although comprehensive plans initially
were designed to project an "end-state" for particular communi-
ties,2 5 the more general "policy plan," which sets forth the commu-
nity's goals and guiding principles,2 6 has been employed on a larger
scale since it permits greater flexibility in meeting the changing
needs of the community and region.
"contain a city planning Commission's recommendations for the development of the munici-
pality." HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 7.01, at 96 (citing SPEA, supra note 19, § 6). It is inter-
esting to note that the SPEA has been characterized as a mere "shopping list of acceptable
plan elements." Mandelker, supra note 15, at 952.
21 See Bagne, supra note 8, at 280 n.47. The relationship between the SPEA's "master
plan" and the SZEA's "comprehensive plan" was not indicated in the SPEA. Id. Conse-
quently, there has been confusion as to whether the terms are, in fact, synonymous. Com-
pare 5 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 37.01[1], at 37-12 to -13 (1982) (com-
prehensive plan is not the equivalent of master plan) with HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 7.01,
at 96 (the term "master plan" is used, to avoid confusion, in place of "comprehensive plan,"
"general plan," and other various terms).
2 HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 7.01, at 96. In addition to being defined as "an indepen-
dent, long-term plan for use and development of land," id., the comprehensive plan has
been described as "[t]he basic instrument for county or municipal land use planning...
[and] a general plan to control and direct the use and development of property in a munici-
pality," Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 583, 507 P.2d 23, 27 (1973) (cita-
tions omitted).
21 See Haar, supra note 17, at 1154. Haar opined that zoning should be considered only
one means of implementing a plan of broader scope. Id. The use of zoning as a plan imple-
mentation device, however, appears to present some practical problems. For example, since
zoning maps place their emphasis upon present uses of the land, they may conflict with the
future orientation of the comprehensive plan. T. PATTERSON, LAND USE PLAN-
NING-TECHNIQUES OF IMPLEMENTATION 29-31 (1979). Nevertheless, zoning remains one of
the most commonly used land use planning techniques. See id. at 31.
21 5 P. ROHAN, supra note 21, § 37.01[1], at 37-4 (footnotes omitted).
21 Mandelker, supra note 15, at 918-19. The employment of a specific end-state plan
necessarily entails the forecasting of long-range future uses and developments in the partic-
ular area. See id. Such plans have been criticized, however, on the ground that they en-
courage "sprawl and spotty development." See T. PATTERSON, supra note 23, at 30.
25 Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 583, 507 P.2d 23, 27 (1973) ("plan
embodies policy determinations and guiding principles ... [while] zoning ordinances pro-
vide the detailed means of giving effect to those principles").
17 See Mandelker, supra note 15, at 918-19. But see MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 3-101, at
123 (1976) (expressly rejecting the position "that objectives should be stated solely in words,
1982]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:127
The Role of the Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Planning
Legislative and judicial responses to the use of the comprehen-
sive plan illustrate its current importance to land use planning in
the United States."S To be sure, various state legislatures have rec-
ognized that the comprehensive plan should be akin to a "constitu-
tion" that governs local land use decisionmaking.29 Consequently,
these states have required that any ordinances passed by the local
government be consistent with the local or state comprehensive
plan then in effect.30 Notably, Oregon not only mandates that new
ordinances comply with the local and state plans, but also prohib-
its the enforcement of any existing city or county ordinance that
conflicts with the plans.3' In the absence of such legislative guid-
ance, however, the resolution of land use disputes generally has
been left to the judiciary.3 2
An examination of the case law on this subject indicates that
and adopt[ing] the view that maps and diagrams may be the best media of communication
in some circumstances"). See generally T. PATTERSON, supra note 23, at 30 (use of zoning
map causes difficulties for future planning).
28 See Sullivan & Kressel, Twenty Years After-Renewed Significance of the Compre-
hensive Plan Requirement, 9 URB. L. ANN. 33, 33-34 (1975). The increased use of compre-
hensive plans may be attributed to several factors, including a growing concern for the envi-
ronment, distrust of local decisionmakers who act without the aid of a plan, and expanding
judicial and legislative participation in the planning area. See id. It has been noted that
"[p]erhaps the [past] relegation of planning to the background reflected an over-all skepti-
cism toward the unproven city planning profession, which faced an uphill struggle against
deeply imbedded American resentment of centralized power." Id. at 37 (footnotes omitted).
Moreover, although professional planners may, in fact, be objective, a risk exists that their
decisions will be "arbitrary since [they] bear little responsibility for distribution of the costs
or benefits of their activity." Tarlock, supra note 16, at 76. Thus, with the importance of
comprehensive plans held in a delicate balance, distrust of local decisionmakers enhances
the interest in such plans while suspiciousness of planners curtails their use. See generally
Sullivan & Kressel, supra, at 33-37.
"2 See HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 7.04-.05, at 104-09. Characterization of the compre-
hensive plan as a "constitution" is attributed to Professor Haar. See Haar, The Master
Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 353, 376 (1955).
20 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (Deering Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3194
(West Supp. 1981). In California, the requisite consistency between zoning regulations and a
comprehensive plan exists "when a city has officially adopted such a plan and the various
land uses authorized by ordinance are compatible with the objectives, policies, general land
uses and program specified in such a plan." PUBLIC POLICY AND PLANNING, UNIVERSrY Ex-
TENSION, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA PLANNING LAW AND LAND-USE
REGULATIONS 9 (1981) [hereinafter cited as CALIFORNIA PLANNING LAW]; see Friends of "B"
Street v. City of Hayward, 106 Cal. App. 3d 988, 998, 165 Cal. Rptr. 514, 520 (Ct. App. 1980)
(general plan is a constitution for future development in the city).
3' OR. REV. STAT. § 197.010 (1981); see HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 7.04, at 104-05.
2 See generally Mandelker, supra note 15, at 932, 937.
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the courts have had differing views as to the significance of the
comprehensive plan. Illustrative of one judicial approach is the
case of First Hartford Realty Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Com-
mission,33 wherein the Connecticut Supreme Court, in upholding a
rezoning3 4 despite its apparent inconsistency with the town's com-
prehensive plan,3" stated that "[t]he requirement of a comprehen-
sive plan is generally satisfied when the zoning authority acts with
the intention of promoting the best interests of the entire commu-
nity. ' 36 Another judicial view of the comprehensive plan was ex-
pressed in Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview Community Council v.
Snohomish County,37 in which the Supreme Court of Washington
observed that "[n]onconformance with a comprehensive plan does
not necessarily render the [rezoning] action illegal .... The plan
is only a general blueprint and thus only general conformance is
necessary. '3 8 The court therefore permitted the controversial zon-
11 165 Conn. 533, 338 A.2d 490 (1973).
U "Rezoning" refers to a zoning ordinance amendment that may involve either a major
reworking of the ordinance to meet changing needs of the community or simply minor revi-
sions designed to solve conflicts that have arisen. See T. PATTERSON, supra note 23, at 39.
The specific rezoning measure may result in controversy and, ultimately, litigation, due to
the possibility that local decisionmakers may be susceptible to special interests or parochial
bias that would influence their position on the proposal. See HANDBOOK, supra note 2, §
6.05, at 88-89. Arguments against the practice of rezoning are based upon the fact that
"standards for granting or denying rezonings consist only of 'mistake' or 'changed condi-
tions' - standards which can be contrived to fit almost any situation and which are so
broad as to provide virtually no guidance to the developers, to concerned citizens, or to the
decision-makers." Id. at 88. A minority of jurisdictions, however, apply more stringent stan-
dards when considering whether rezonings should be upheld, viewing such determinations as
"quasi-judicial" in nature. Id. § 6.06, at 89. Thus, since predetermined standards are applied
to each particular proposal, much of the potential for legislative abuse is eliminated. Id.
" 165 Conn. at 541, 338 A.2d at 495.
36 Id.; see, e.g., Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 63 N.J. 335, 343,
307 A.2d 563, 567 (1973); Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 655, 657-58,
202 S.E.2d 889, 892-93 (1974).
37 96 Wash. 2d 201, 634 P.2d 853 (1981) (en banc).
"' Id. at 212, 634 P.2d at 860 (citations omitted). In Cathcart, the plaintiffs, residents
of nearby communities, sought judicial review of Snohomish County's approval of the rezon-
ing of two parcels of land. Id. at 204, 634 P.2d at 856. The plaintiffs claimed that the
county, by approving a rezoning that was inconsistent with the existing land use plans, ac-
ted in an arbitrary manner and in effect, engaged in spot zoning. Id. at 211, 634 P.2d at 859-
60. The court, however, did not view the inconsistency as fatal to the validity of the rezon-
ing. Id. at 213, 634 P.2d at 860; see, e.g., Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco, 33
N.Y.2d 178, 188, 306 N.E.2d 155, 159, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129, 136 (1973); cf. State v. City of
Hailey, 102 Idaho 511, 515, 633 P.2d 576, 580 (1981) (very !ittle weight accorded comprehen-
sive plan in determining validity of annexation ordinance); Tarlock, supra note 16, at 109
(consistency with comprehensive plan is "some evidence of [the] reasonableness" of land use
ordinances). In Town of Bedford, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the town's claim
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ing change notwithstanding its deviance from two comprehensive
plans."s Finally, an approach requiring strict consistency with the
comprehensive plan was exemplified in 1000 Friends v. Board of
County Commissioners.40 In that case, the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals concluded that "[t]here is a recognized hierarchical relation-
ship between comprehensive plan, zoning laws and subdivision or-
dinances."'41 Thus, after the decision is made to approve a
tentative subdivision and the decisionmakers ensure that the ap-
proved subdivision complies with the local zoning ordinances, it is
necessary to determine whether the zoning ordinance comports
with the comprehensive plan.42
Often, the weight which various courts accord a comprehen-
sive plan will depend upon their willingness to look beyond the
plan itself and examine the underlying policy considerations and
regional needs.43 This analysis comports with several courts' adop-
that the rezoning permitted by the defendant, an adjoining village, was invalid due to the
rezoning's inconsistency with the village comprehensive plan. 33 N.Y.2d at 188-89, 306
N.E.2d at 159-60, 35 N.Y.S.2d at 137. Dissenting, Judge Breitel decried the majority's lack
of sensitivity to the regional effects which the rezoning most surely would generate. See id.
at 192, 306 N.E.2d at 162, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 139 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
39 '96 Wash. 2d at 213, 634 P.2d at 860.
40 32 Or. App. 413, 575 P.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1978).
"I Id. at 421, 575 P.2d at 656; accord Forestview Homeowner's Ass'n v. County of Cook,
18 Ill. App. 3d 230, 240-41, 309 N.E.2d 763, 771 (App. Ct. 1974); Daviess County v. Snyder,
556 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Ky. 1977).
42 32 Or. App. at 421, 575 P.2d at 656. The court in 1000 Friends compared the compre-
hensive plan to a constitution with which all zoning regulations and ordinances must com-
ply. Id.; see supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
43 See, e.g., Associated Homebuilders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 601-02, 557
P.2d 473, 483-84, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 51-52 (1976); Southern Burlington NAACP v. Township
of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 175, 336 A.2d 713, 725, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Surrick
v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 188-90, 382 A.2d 105, 108-09 (1977). In the landmark
Mt. Laurel decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down a township's zoning ordi-
nances that were designed to restrict residency in the township to persons of medium and
upper income. 78 N.J. at 185, 336 A.2d at 730-31. Moreover, the court imposed an affirma-
tive duty on developing municipalities to plan in such a way as to offer housing opportuni-
ties to all classes of citizens, not solely to the fiscally desirable. Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
The court imposed such a duty "at least to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the
present and prospective regional need therefor." Id. Thus, the Mt. Laurel decision effec-
tively extended the bounds of judicial review to include socio-economic issues in land use
cases. See Freilich, New and Significant Zoning Decisions-What Are the Courts Doing to
Zoning, 1979 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 1, 31-34; Rohan, Property Planning
and the Search for a Comprehensive Housing Policy-The View from Mt. Laurel, 49 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 653, 667 (1975). See generally Delogu, The Misuse of Land Use Control
Powers Must End: Suggestions for Legislative and Judicial Responses, 32 ME. L. lav. 29,
48 (1980) (some courts recently have shown impatience with municipalities' attempts to
take advantage of traditional judicial restraint in the planning area when the governmental
1982] LAND USE PLANNING
tion of the "regional general welfare" approach, which necessitates
that a particular town's land use plan or zoning ordinance be scru-
tinized in light of its effect upon the welfare of both the town itself
and its surrounding region." For example, in Berenson v. Town of
New Castle,45 the New York Court of Appeals enunciated a two-
pronged test to be used in determining the validity of a zoning or-
dinance, namely, whether the local government has promulgated a
"balanced and well ordered" plan, and whether regional needs
were taken into consideration. 4s Although the Berenson case dealt
specifically with the validity of a zoning ordinance, it is nonethe-
less apparent that regional needs are increasingly being considered
by the judiciary as a major factor in the determination of the
weight to be afforded a comprehensive plan.47
It is clear, therefore, that while the comprehensive plan is typ-
ically not a binding instrument, it does represent an important and
viable tool that may aid in the resolution of land use planning con-
troversies. 48 Moreover, provided the plan and its subordinate regu-
lations are not designed to further exclusionary, parochial inter-
ests,49 and its underlying policies are implemented effectively, the
entity enacts legislation that is more subtle in its exclusionary effects).
44 See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
46 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975). In Berenson, the plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of a New Castle zoning ordinance that restricted most of
the town to 1 and 2 acre residential developments. Id. at 105, 341 N.E.2d at 238, 378
N.Y.S.2d at 676.
16 Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81. The Berenson court indicated
that it would look beyond the particular ordinance being challenged in order to determine
its validity, stating that "[its] concern is not whether the zones, in themselves, are balanced
communities, but whether the town itself, as provided for by its zoning ordinances, will be a
balanced and integrated community." Id. at 109, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
The regional general welfare approach adopted in New York varies, somewhat, from the
regional welfare approach taken by New Jersey in Mt. Laurel, see supra note 43, insofar as
the former does not mandate that the particular community provide its "fair share" of re-
gional housing needs. Indeed, New York simply requires that regional considerations be-
come part of the planning process. See R. FREmncH & E. STUHLE , Introduction to THE
LAND USE AWAKENING 16 (1981). It is interesting that the New Jersey approach has been
modified, to a degree, by recent case law manifesting the judiciary's discomfort with the task
of determining a region's actual housing needs. See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township
of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 546-47, 371 A.2d 1192, 1224 (1977); R. FRMLICH & E. STUHLER,
supra, at 15; Bagne, supra, note 8, at 300.
47 See Freilich, supra note 43, at 38-41.
48 See Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 109-10, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81.
4 See id., 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681. In Berenson, the court stated that
"[tihere must be a balancing of the local desire to maintain the status quo within the com-
munity and the greater public interest that regional needs be met." Id. Indeed, a court must
examine all of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of a zoning ordinance prior to
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planning goals envisioned by the community can be achieved."
Once a comprehensive plan has been developed and adopted by an
area, the focus thus shifts to the implementation of its underlying
policies. The authority of the local governmental entity to imple-
ment the plan is derived from the state's delegation of its police
power, taxing power, power of eminent domain, and spending
power. 1 Each of these powers is the source of a concomitant im-
plementation device that enables the governmental entity to effec-
tuate its land use programs. Zoning5" and subdivision regulations, 3
upholding its validity. See id. at 109-10, 341 N.E.2d at 241-42, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81.
50 See Vestal, supra note 9, at 156-57. The development of the comprehensive plan is
merely the first step toward effective land use planning. Id. at 157. A community may adopt
a plan and subsequently disregard it, thereby continuing its ad hoc decisionmaking. Id.
Hence, proper implementation of the plan's policies is imperative. See id. See generally C.
RHYNE, supra note 10, § 26.97, at 922 ("there must be a direct and tangible link" between
zoning and the comprehensive plan in order to avoid a piecemeal approach to land use
planning).
51 T. PATTERSON, supra note 23, at 21. The police power, the power of eminent domain,
and the taxing and spending powers are considered the four basic powers of government. Id.
The delegation of these powers by a state to its local governments provides the latter with
the "legislative tools" for plan implementation. Id. It is through these legislative tools that
the local government may utilize the "legal tools," that is, ordinances and regulations, to
achieve its land use objectives. Id.
51 Zoning "provides for the division of a local government unit into districts by catego-
ries of allowed and/or prohibited land uses. Within the districts, zoning regulates the height
and bulk (cubage) of buildings and other structures . . . ; minimum lot sizes; [and] the
amount of open space ... ." T. PATTERSON, supra note 23, at 27. The particular zoning
regulation must be a reasonable exercise of the local government's police power, or it may be
challenged as an unconstitutional taking without due process and just compensation. Id. at
28. Furthermore, the zoning ordinance should not be used to "buttress exclusionary tenden-
cies." Heyman, Legal Assaults on Muhicipal Land Use Regulation, in THE LAND USE
AWAKNING 51-53 (1981).
In addition to the traditional forms of zoning, such as large lot zoning and conditional
use permits, several innovative zoning methods have been used or proposed. Planned unit
development (PUD), for example, clusters a variety of building structures and lot sizes to-
gether in one area. 5 P. ROHAN, supra note 21, § 37.05[2], at 37-82. Cluster zoning, on the
other hand, permits a developer to group residential dwellings closer together than a dis-
trict's conventional zoning would allow. See Zoning, supra note 2, at 1440. A "floating zone"
is a technique that authorizes selected uses of property in areas of the community in which
these uses ordinarily would not be permitted. See 1 E. YOKLEY, supra note 2, §§ 5-7, at 232-
33. The "floating" aspect of the zone is that the specific site of the particular use usually is
not designated on a zoning map. T. PATrEmON, supra note 23, at 40. Finally, impact zoning
is based upon "the view that in a given place anything may be done which conforms to the
physical, social, and economic impact requirements deemed acceptable by the relevant mu-
nicipality." Freilich & Quinn, Effectiveness of Flexible and Conditional Zoning Tech-
niques-What They Can and What They Can Not Do For Our Cities, 1979 INST. ON PLAN.
ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 167, 171. Each of these methods attempts to make zoning regu-
lations more responsive to the area's particular characteristics and needs. See Zoning, supra
note 2, at 1440.
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for example, are instituted under the aegis of the police power, 54
while the taxing power is used to create tax incentives to attract
businesses and industries.5 5 The power to spend and the expropria-
tion power, on the other hand, permit the local government to con-
demn land for public use.56
A program of local timing and growth management, combining
zoning, subdivision regulations, and other planning devices, is yet
another plan implementation device that has been employed in re-
cent years. 7 The validity of such a program was upheld in Golden
" Subdivision regulations commonly serve as a plan implementation device. See T.
PATTERSON, supra note 23, at 92; CALIFORNIA PLANNING LAW, supra note 30, at 296. The
subdivision has been defined as "any division of land for the purpose of sale, lease, or
finance . . . " Id. Through subdivision regulations, local government officials have the op-
portunity to impose standards for the development of specific parcels of land. See T. PAT-
TERSON, supra note 23, at 92-93. Thus, depending upon the restrictive scope of the regula-
tions, the officials effectively may encourage or discourage a proposed development. See id.
In any event, such regulations can ensure that the societal costs incident to a new develop-
ment, such as increased demand for police protection, sewers, water, schools, and recreation,
will be borne as equitably as possible by the developer and the affected community. See id.
at 93-94.
54 T. PATTERSON, supra note 23, at 21-22. The "police power" of a state has been de-
scribed as "the power to impose regulations which have a reasonable tendency to serve the
health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public." Note, Regional Development and
the Courts, 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 600, 602-03 (1965). The Supreme Court, in Village of Eu-
clid, declared that all zoning ordinances and other land use regulations must "find their
justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare." Village of
Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388. The "public welfare" referred to in connection with the police
power has been interpreted to extend beyond municipal borders. See Note, supra, at 602-07.
I' T. PATTERSON, supra note 23, at 22. The taxing power of the state, as delegated to a
local government, primarily is utilized to raise revenue for governmental expenditures. Id.
Although the current use of the taxing power as a plan implementation device may be lim-
ited, it has formed the basis of a proposal for an alternative state land use control system.
See Comment, State Land Use Statutes: A Comparative Analysis, 45 FORDHAM L. REV.
1154, 1177 (1977). This proposal "seeks to effect regulation through tax incentives. The ad-
ministrative agency together with local governments classify land into tax categories accord-
ing to most desirable use." Id. (footnote omitted). Consequently, through the use of these
financial incentives, residents and developers are encouraged to comply with the system. Id.
F8 T. PATTERSON, supra note 23, at 22. Eminent domain, "the power to take land for
public purposes with just compensation," and the spending power, "the right of government
to spend public monies for public purposes," usually are exercised in conjunction with one
another. Id. Under the guise of "public purpose," the government uses public monies to
provide just compensation for land taken by eminent domain. Id.
57 See, e.g., Giuliano v. Town of Edgartown, 531 F. Supp. 1076, 1083 (D. Mass. 1982).
Local growth management regulations have been adopted in response to increased urban
sprawl and the attendant burden placed upon municipalities to provide adequate public
services. See R. FREILIcH & E. STUHLER, supra note 46, at 32. These regulations are designed
to relate the community's growth to its ability to provide municipal services. Id. at 33. The
reaction to this technique, however, has been mixed insofar as growth management has re-
sulted in at least a four-way battle:
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v. Planning Board5 in which a town sought to tie its future devel-
opment to its ability to provide adequate municipal services.5 9 Rec-
ognizing that an attempt at circumvention of this program was in-
evitable, and that such an attempt might be in the form of a
"defensive incorporation," the Town of Ramapo enacted a Village
Incorporation Law to supplement the state's incorporation require-
ments.60 In Marcus v. Baron,61 a New York appellate court sus-
It is favored by environmentalists and by voters who want to keep tax rates down.
In opposition are landowner/builders and advocates of low-to-moderate-income
housing. Each of these groups has a legitimate point to make, and each has won a
case here or there. Consequently, there is no national consensus, no sterotyped
[sic] "liberal" or "conservative" position.
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 10.03, at 147.
- 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972). In Golden, the plaintiffs were landowners who challenged the town's denial of ap-
proval of a subdivision plat, which denial was based upon the plaintiff's failure to obtain the
requisite permit. 30 N.Y.2d at 364, 285 N.E.2d at 293, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 140-41. The issuance
of this permit was contingent upon the availability to the proposed development of five
municipal services. Id. at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143-44. In determining the
validity of the town's program, the court observed that there was a need for some method of
curbing the harmful effects of undirected growth, and, although conceding that statewide or
regional planning would be ideal, concluded that Ramapo's regulations furthered this inter-
est. Id. at 374-80, 285 N.E.2d at 299-303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149-54. Counsel for the Town of
Ramapo, recognizing the significance of the court's decision, stated that "[w]hat we have
fought for and won was the right of a community to chart its own destiny within [a] frame-
work of reasonable planning." Freilich, Golden v. Town of Ramapo: Establishing a New
Dimension in American Planning Law, in THE LAND USE AWAKENING 124 (1981).
51 30 N.Y.2d at 372-76, 285 N.E.2d at 298-301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 147-50. The court,
though noting that the enabling legislation did not sanction explicitly the use of phased
growth methods, opined that "phased growth is well within the ambit of existing enabling
legislation." Id. at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150. Dissenting, Judge Breitel
refused to imply such a grant of power in the enabling legislation, reasoning that, "for policy
reasons, one should not strain the reading of the enabling acts.., to distort them, beyond
any meaning ever attributed to them, except by the ingenious draftsmen of the Ramapo
ordinance." Id. at 386, 285 N.E.2d at 306, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 158-59 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
For a criticism of the Golden decision, see Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a
Law to Bind the Rights of the Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 234, 249-50 (1973).
10 See infra note 62 and accompanying text. Under the state incorporation statute, the
petition for incorporation must contain the following.
(1) An allegation of the basis on which the petition is signed.
(2) The name of the proposed village.
(3) An allegation that such territory contains a population of at least five hundred
regular inhabitants.
(4) The manner in which the area requirements of section 2-200... are satisfied.
(5) A designation of at least one but no more than three persons, giving full
names and addresses, on whom and at which addresses all papers required to be
served in connection with the proceeding for incorporation, shall be served. A ma-
jority of such designees must reside in such territory.
(6) Each page of the petition and all exhibits and certifications shall be securely
fastened together.
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tained the validity of a law which vested in the town supervisor the
authority to determine whether a proposed incorporation would
be, inter alia, in the overall public interest of the area in question,
the remainder of the town, and any of the special districts in the
area.6 2 Rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the town exceeded
its delegated authority by enacting the law, the court placed pri-
mary emphasis upon the town's comprehensive planning and the
trends in state and national policies regarding land use. 3 To ap-
preciate the controversy engendered by the use of an incorporation
statute as a method of implementing a comprehensive plan, it is
helpful to examine the reasons for a community's incorporation
and the problems caused by extensive governmental frag-
mentation.
N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 2-202 (McKinney 1973). It is submitted that, in light of the purely
procedural emphasis in the New York State statute, the Town of Ramapo appropriately was
concerned with its adequacy in preventing unnecessary and detrimental incorporations.
1 84 App. Div. 2d 118, 445 N.Y.S.2d 587 (2d Dep't 1981). The plaintiffs in Marcus were
among 500 persons named on the incorporation petition for the Village of Wesley Hills. Id.
at 119, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 590. The town supervisor declined to approve the petition on both
procedural and substantive grounds, stating that the incorporation would not be in the over-
all public interest. Id. at 122-23, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 592. The supervisor reasoned that to de-
cide otherwise, and thus permit the proposed incorporation, would increase tax burdens on
the town, detrimentally affect its bonding ability, place strain on the town's sewer program,
and possibly devastate the town's planning. Id. at 123, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
62 See id. at 132, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 597; Ramapo, N.Y., [1967] N.Y. Local Laws 1909 (No.
3). The Ramapo local law, after an initial explication of the town's adoption of its compre-
hensive plan, sets forth the reasons for the incorporation requirements that supplemented
the state's procedural statute. See Ramapo, N.Y., [1967] N.Y. Local Laws 1909 (No. 3). The
town feared that "[n]ew villages formed within the unincorporated area of the town of
Ramapo may have a detrimental effect on the master plan, zoning ordinance, official map
and capital budget of the town, by destroying the unity and cohesiveness of these carefully
balanced programs and may be detrimental to the over-all comprehensive planning of the
town." Id.
63 84 App. Div. 2d at 132-33, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 597-98. The plaintiffs challenged the
town's local law on the grounds that it was preempted by the state statutes on incorporation
and that it therefore violated the state constitution and the Municipal Home Rule law
granting broad powers to the local government. Id. at 124-25, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 593. The
court rejected both of these claims, however, concluding "that Local Law No. 3, rather than
being inconsistent with article 2 of the Village Law, constitutes a complementary or a con-
sistent extension of such law and is furthermore a refinement of overall State policy." Id. at
132, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 597 (citations omitted). Justice Hopkins, dissenting, argued that to
allow the town to determine whether an independent governmental entity could be formed
was to permit an encroachment upon the powers exercisable solely by the state legislature.
Id. at 134-36, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
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COMMUNITY INCORPORATION
The municipal corporation,6 4 with its attendant powers to tax,
regulate land use, and establish community policies,65 not only
may be a desirable alternative for a particular area but may, in
The municipal corporation has been defined as "a body politic created by the incor-
poration of the people of a prescribed locality and invested with subordinate powers of Iegis-
lation to assist in the civil government of the state and to regulate and administer local and
internal affairs of the community." Tooke, The Status of the Municipal Corporation in
American Law, 16 MINN. L. REV. 343, 343 (1932) (footnote omitted). These incorporated
governments are to be distinguished from the unincorporated towns or counties that often
are referred to as "quasi-municipal corporations." Id. at 359 n.54. Municipal corporations
typically are areas within existing towns or counties that seek to incorporate in the interest
of self-rule, see Vestal, supra note 9, at 155-57, while quasi-municipal corporations are enti-
ties formed by the state for governmental purposes, see id.; 39 N.Y. JUR. Municipal Corpo-
rations § 4 (1965). Generally, therefore, once a community incorporates it is not bound by
the policies and regulations of the town or county. See Mandelker, Standards for Municipal
Incorporations on the Urban Fringe, 36 TEx. L. REV. 271, 274-75 (1958); cf. City of South
San Francisco v. Berry, 120 Cal. App. 2d 252, 252, 260 P.2d 1045, 1045 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953)
(property annexed to a municipality no longer is subject to the county's zoning ordinances).
5 In the majority of states, the source of power of municipal corporations is embodied
in home rule provisions that provide local governments with the authority to govern matters
within their own boundaries. 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 3.01, at 3-7
(1982); see Andersen, Resolving StateLocal Governmental Conflict-A Tale of Three Cit-
ies, 18 URB. L. ANN. 129, 130 (1980). Typically, these provisions either are self-executing
grants of power located directly in the state's constitution or legislation enacted pursuant to
constitutional mandate. 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra, § 3.01, at 3-7; see Andersen, supra, at 130.
New York is somewhat unique in that it has both constitutional and legislative home rule
provisions. Comment, Home Rule: Constitutionally Granted Planning and Zoning Powers
vs. State Concern for Preservation of the Adirondacks, 16 URB. L. ANN. 389, 394 (1979); see
N.Y. CONsT. art. IX, § 2[c](ii); N.Y. MUN. HoME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i) (McKinney 1969).
Generally, a state legislature may revoke or amend statutorily granted home rule powers,
while constitutionally granted home rule powers "fix the authority of the state with respect
to local self-government" and may only be revoked or amended in accordance with the re-
quirements for amending the constitution. Comment, supra, at 393 (footnote omitted). The
delegated powers set forth in home rule provisions eventually are reflected in the municipal
charters of the corporation. 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra, § 3.01, at 3-7.
In addition to its legal function as a means of distributing power, home rule has ac-
quired a second meaning, namely, local autonomy. See Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal
Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 644-45 (1964). As a
political symbol, home rule represents "the freedom of a local unit of government to pursue
self-determined goals without interference by the legislature or other agencies of the state
government." Id. at 644 (footnote omitted). Because the powers granted to a municipal gov-
ernment generally relate to the local "property, affairs or government," e.g., N.Y. MuN.
HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i) (McKinney 1969), while the state retains plenary powers in mat-
ters of state or "general" concern, see Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REV.
1059, 1109 (1980), the actual extent of municipal power is often unclear, see Sandalow,
supra, at 652. Thus, it largely has been left to the judiciary to form the municipal corpora-
tion as it exists today and to allow for its expansion or contraction to meet the changing
needs of the community. See Tooke, supra note 64, at 360.
LAND USE PLANNING
fact, be a necessity for its inhabitants."' Indeed, funds necessary to
the provision of adequate public services may be more readily
available to a municipal corporation than to an unincorporated en-
tity.67 Furthermore, a municipality, rather than a larger govern-
mental entity, would have direct control over the distribution of
such funds and, presumably, would be more "finely tuned" to the
specific needs of the community."' The experience of the city of
Pearl, Mississippi, poignantly illustrates that the attainment of
municipal status may be indispensable to a particular community.
Denying an adjoining city's challenge to Pearl's incorporation, 9
the Supreme Court of Mississippi, influenced by the conditions ex-
isting within Pearl, stated that "[t]here is a voluntary fire depart-
ment, but it has not been able to save any house from burning
down, although it has saved houses next door to the fire .... The
area is plagued with problems concerning garbage, sewage, and
septic tanks."70 Clearly, the funds available to Pearl subsequent to
incorporation would aid in correcting these problems.71
The desire for governmental independence also is a significant
consideration in the decision to incorporate. Although this aspi-
ration may be attributed in part to "the mythology of the grass-
roots ideal of small town government, 7 2 it also may be prompted
66 See, e.g., State ex rel. Northern Pump Co. v. So-Called Village of Fridley, 233 Minn.
442, 450, 47 N.W.2d 204, 210 (1951) (considerable development in the area presents need for
greater governmental service); City of Jackson v. Petitioners for Incorporation, 318 So. 2d
843, 845 (Miss. 1975) ("public convenience and necessity" require incorporation).
67 See City of Jackson v. Petitioners for Incorporation, 318 So. 2d 843, 846 (Miss. 1975).
In City of Jackson, the court related the testimony of an agent of the State Board of Health
in which the agent had stated that since an incorporated municipality would have first pri-
ority in determining the allocation of the board's funds, the area's desperate need for sani-
tary facilities probably would be met by incorporation. Id.
68 Cf. C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, CrrY ZONING: THE ONCE AND FuTuRE FRONTIER 253
(1979) (with respect to cities, the "decisionmaking process ought to be kept as close as possi-
ble to the problem").
69 Boling v. City of Jackson, 279 So. 2d 590, 593-94 (Miss. 1973). The Supreme Court of
Mississippi disagreed with the lower court's finding that the proposed incorporation was
unreasonable due to the prohibitive operating costs of the new municipality. Id. at 593. The
adjoining city of Jackson had argued that it would be less costly to eventually permit Jack-
son to annex the area. Id. Rejecting this argument, the court stated that due to the area's
needs, to affirm the lower court's denial of municipal status "would amount to assigning this
large community to limbo .. " Id.
70 Id. at 592-93.
71 See generally C. RHYNE, supra note 10, § 4.6, at 62-63 (included among the govern-
mental functions of a municipality are the operation of fire departments and the protection
against disease and unsanitary conditions).
72 Grant, Trends in Urban Government and Administration, 30 LAW & ColrSmP.
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by exclusionary, parochial interests."a "Defensive incorporation,"
whereby a community attempts to avoid restrictive regulations or
land use policies of a town or county, exemplifies this exclusionary
attitude.74 In United States v. City of Black Jack,75 for instance,
the defendant-city incorporated primarily in order to prevent the
construction of a county-planned low to moderate income housing
development in the community.76 Shortly after its formation, the
new municipality enacted a zoning ordinance that prohibited the
construction of multiple-family dwellings within its boundaries.77
This ordinance, however, subsequently was held invalid by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.78 Notably, defensive incorpora-
tions also have been used to avoid annexation to an existing mu-
nicipality," to prevent the construction of a sanitary landfill, 0 to
PROBS. 38, 49 (1965) (footnote omitted).
7' See Bagne, supra note 8, at 271. A municipality may be formed solely in order to
acquire the benefits of local control and to avoid any responsibility for problems arising
outside its borders. Id.
71 See generally Mandelker, supra note 64, at 275 (there may be a "balkanization of
zoning controls" as more communities incorporate and enact their own land use ordinances).
When the defensive aspects of the incorporation are obvious, the incorporation petition typ-
ically will not be approved. See 1 E. YOKELY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATONS § 15, at 17 (Supp.
1980).
75 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
70 508 F.2d at 1182. In 1965, St. Louis County adopted a master plan for the entire
county, including 1,700 acres which later became the city of Black Jack. Id. The plan had
designated 67 of the 1,700 acres as the site of a multifamily residential development. Id.
Subsequently, a religious organization commenced plans to build a project which would
have provided housing opportunities for low and moderate income persons. Id. When these
plans became publicly known, the area residents commenced incorporation proceedings and,
in 1970, the city of Black Jack was formed. Id.
17 Id. at 1183. The city of Black Jack, barely 3 months old, enacted an ordinance that
prevented the construction of any new multiple-family dwellings and characterized existing
multifamily dwellings as "nonconforming uses." Id.
78 Id. at 1188. The Eighth Circuit, disagreeing with the district court's conclusion that
the ordinance was not discriminatory, stated that the ordinance effectively prevented 85
percent of the blacks in the St. Louis area from obtaining housing in Black Jack at the time
when 40 percent of them had substandard and overcrowded accomodations. Id. at 1186. The
court therefore held that the ordinance violated Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 508 F.2d at 1181.
7' See Town of Ouita v. Heidgen, 247 Ark. 943, 948, 448 S.W.2d 631, 634 (1970). In
Heidgen, the residents of the Town of Ouita wished to incorporate in order to avoid the
proposed annexation of the town to the nearby city of Russellville. Id., 448 S.W.2d at 634.
The court affirmed the denial of the petition for incorporation, however, observing that it
was obvious that the rural territory sought to be incorporated was not suitable for an effec-
tive municipal government and that the petitioners were attempting to avoid the possible
corporate taxes and land ordinances resulting from annexation. Id. Hence, it was apparent
that the residents attempted to incorporate so as to avoid the disadvantages associated with
the existing municipality, rather than to obtain the benefits available to a new municipal
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protect special land uses81 and, as in Marcus v. Baron, to circum-
vent a comprehensive plan.82 Typically, when a newly formed mu-
nicipal corporation successfully enacts regulations that prohibit
undesirable developments and land uses, the burden of accepting
such projects and uses falls upon the surrounding area.83 Hence, it
appears that although the interests of the particular community
may be furthered by its incorporation, the creation of an indepen-
dent governmental entity may have more wide-ranging pernicious
effects.8 4
The attractiveness of municipal status has contributed to in-
creased governmental fragmentation in the United States.85 Such
widespread fragmentation has created several obstacles to the effi-
cient operation of metropolitan governments, including financial
inequities, inequality of services, illogical apportionment of func-
corporation. See id.
80 See Harang v. State ex rel. City of West Columbia, 466 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Tex. Civ. App.
1971). Following the purchase by two Texas cities of a tract of land for use as a landfill
garbage disposal area, residents of the nearby area sought to incorporate as the Village of
Wild Peach. Id. Subsequent to the incorporation, the village passed an ordinance that would
have prevented the cities from dumping garbage in the area. Id. The incorporation was in-
validated, however, based in part upon the inability of the village to perform municipal
services adequately. Id. at 12-13. Indeed, the evidence established that the enactment of the
landfill ordinance had been the only municipal function performed by the village. Id. at 13.
81 See D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 260-61 (1963).
82 Marcus v. Baron, 84 App. Div. 2d 118, 126-30, 445 N.Y.S.2d 587, 594-96 (2d Dep't
1981); see Ramapo, N.Y., [1967] N.Y. Local Laws 1909 (No. 2); supra text accompanying
note 60.
82 See Delogu, The Dilemma of Local Land Use Control: Power Without Responsibil-
ity, 83 ME. L. REV. 15, 17 (1981); Zoning, supra note 2, at 1590-91.
"8 See Bagne, supra note 8, at 272; Mandelker, supra note 64, at 275; Vestal, supra
note 9, at 155.
8" See D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLS LEGISLATION 11 (1976). As
of 1977, there were 18,862 municipalities, 3,042 counties, 16,822 townships, and 25,962 spe-
cial districts in this country. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1980, at 309 (101st ed. 1980). More than one-half of the municipalities had
populations of fewer than 1,000 persons. Id. at 310. The increase in the number of indepen-
dent governmental entities has engendered an increase in exclusionary zoning practices. D.
MANDELKER, supra, at 11. It has been noted that "[simall local governments, even with the
best intentions, simply do not control enough urban space to generate land development
control programs that can take areawide needs into account." Id. Additionally, governmen-
tal fragmentation imposes upon the larger, preexisting governmental entity, the burden of
providing a variety of municipal services to the residents of the new municipality. See R.
LIEBERT, DISINTEGRATION AND POLITIcAL AcTION-THE CHANGING FUNCTIONS OF CITY Gov-
ERNMENTS IN AMERICA 6 (1976). For example, while the municipality's residents still may
travel to the central city in order to work or take advantage of recreational and cultural
activities, thereby utilizing the city's police protection and roads, they avoid the concomi-
tant responsibilities of residency in the city. See id.
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tions, and inefficient duplicity of governance.86 Furthermore, the
local officials of each municipal government within a particular
area, elected by and responsible to their own citizens, presumably
are motivated to zone and plan for land uses that are consistent
with their narrow scope of interest.8 7 In a similar vein, the reve-
nues required to provide a community with adequate services nec-
essarily increase the likelihood that its officials actively will seek
the development of "good tax ratables,"8 rather than encourage
the construction of such essential facilities as multiple-family
dwelling units, schools, or sewage treatment plants that provide lit-
tle, if any, revenue to the municipality.8 ' As a result, the burden of
providing for less desirable tax ratables falls upon a few communi-
ties within a particular region. If the town or county in which these
communities are located has enacted a comprehensive plan pro-
viding for the even distribution of less desirable tax ratables, ex-
tensive governmental fragmentation accompanied by parochial
zoning ordinances effectively may render the comprehensive plan
useless.90
Several methods of curbing future governmental fragmenta-
tion have been proposed, including annexation of the unincorpo-
rated territory to an existing municipality and consolidation of two
or more local governments.9' Another approach which, in fact, has
88 Grant, supra note 72, at 46.
17 See Cunningham, supra note 15, at 405-06 (municipal zoning results in a random and
uncoordinated pattern of land use); Delogu, supra note 83, at 19-20 (local governments
"have. . .interpreted their power. . . as a right to keep out what they individually do not
want"); Note, supra note 54, at 602 (local governments zone and plan for local gain).
88 A "good ratable" has been defined as "a piece of real estate which yields to a govern-
mental subdivision a substantially high real estate tax revenue in relation to the expendi-
tures for services which must be provided for such property." Rohan, supra note 43, at 657
n.19 (citation omitted).
88 See Note, supra note 54, at 602. Due to the increased pressure placed upon local
governments to provide adequate municipal services, and, at the same time, to avoid local
property tax increases, the local government's motivation in land use planning is often fiscal
in nature. See id. A proposed development's tax base thus may be the determining factor in
the locality's ultimate land use decision. Id. Indeed, "[w]hen the particular development is
of a public character, is nontaxable, or presents real or imagined threats which outweigh any
tax advantages, towns often resist the development even though the location may be well
suited to the developer's and the state's needs." Delogu, supra note 83, at 25.
90 See generally Vestal, supra note 9, at 155-56 (local governments frequently are moti-
vated by parochial short-term interests, including the direction of growth and development
that is most advantageous to its own residents).
81 See Mandelker, supra note 64, at 296-97. If an attempt to incorporate truly is moti-
vated by a desire to obtain the benefits of municipal services, it is suggested that rather
than creating a separate entity, the combination of governments or the annexation approach
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been implemented, permits voters of the county to vest the taxing,
zoning, and land use authority in the towns."2 Any village that is
incorporated in the county after the enactment of the statute thus
would be without the potential power to thwart any of the larger
area's planning.9 3 It is suggested, however, that a municipal incor-
poration statute that embodies a meaningful review of an incorpo-
ration's impact upon the immediate and surrounding areas is a
more potent method of deterring extensive governmental fragmen-
tation 4 and of maintaining the effectiveness of existing compre-
hensive plans. 5
THE INCORPORATION STATUTE AS A PLAN IMPLEMENTATION DEVICE
The potential utility of the incorporation statute as a means of
furthering the goals of a comprehensive plan depends upon the
character of the incorporation requirements and the system pro-
vided for reviewing the incorporation petition.96 While a majority
of the states have enacted some form of incorporation statute,7
may be a reasonable alternative to incorporaton. Either of these two methods, it is submit-
ted, would achieve the desired goal yet limit further governmental fragmentation. Rather
than having two separate and independent governmental units, each concerned only with its
own interests, it appears that there would be one unified governmental authority that would
manage the interests of the enlarged community.
92 In 1936, the legislature of the State of New York enacted the Alternate County Gov-
ernment Law, and, 2 years later, Nassau County voters elected to adopt the statute. See
County of Nassau v. Incorporated Village of Woodsburgh, 109 Misc. 2d 299, 299, 437
N.Y.S.2d 875, 876 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981), aff'd, 86 App. Div. 2d 856, 447 N.Y.S.2d
326 (2d Dep't 1982). As judicially interpreted, the law basically provided:
[E]xisting and future legislation which conferred on towns powers with respect to
zoning matters were to remain in force and that powers then or thereafter con-
ferred by law on any town, board or commission thereof shall be exercised within
all portions of town unincorporated as a village on date on which act became effec-
tive irrespective of inclusion thereof in a village erected or incorporated after such
date.
Incorporated Village of Atlantic Beach v. Town of Hempstead, 19 N.Y.2d 929, 930, 228
N.E.2d 395, 395, 281 N.Y.S.2d 337, 337-38 (1967); see Garnett v. Incorporated Village of
Atlantic Beach, 84 Misc. 2d 460, 462, 376 N.Y.S.2d 802, 804 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975).
93 See supra note 92.
'4 See generally Mandelker, supra note 64, at 276-77 (the lack of meaningful standards
for incorporation "may actually facilitate the cutting up of urban areas").
95 See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
0 See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
97 M. HILL, STATE LAWS GOVERNING LocAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRA-
TION 4 (1978). The restrictions placed upon the ability to incorporate are more substantive
in the South, West and Northcentral regions of the United States. Id. at 5. The more proce-
dural requirements exist in the statutes of the Northeastern states "probably because the
region is so well established that there is little need or desire for municipalities." Id. It is
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most of these statutes contain few, if any, meaningful substantive
requirements for incorporation." The Arizona statute, for example,
allows a "community" composed of more than 1,500 persons to in-
corporate if these individuals have certain "common interests" and
they "are acquainted and mingle in business, social, educational
and recreational activities."9 9 It appears that such requirements
provide virtually no protection against defensive incorporations
that are designed to circumvent existent comprehensive plans.
In contrast to Arizona's rather vague requirements, the Indi-
ana statute sets forth detailed prerequisites to incorporation.100
For example, the petition for incorporation itself, in addition to
the standard procedural matters, must state that the incorporation
"is in the best interests of the citizens of the territory."101, More
importantly, the Indiana statute particularizes the conditions
which must be satisfied before the county executive may approve
the incorporation. Among such conditions are the incorporating
community's ability to provide adequate municipal services' 0 2 and
suggested that although there may, in fact, be little need for more municipalities in the
Northeast, there nevertheless may be the desire for defensive incorporation. Therefore,
while a substantive incorporation statute may not be necessary to halt further governmental
fragmentation in the Northeast, it still has the potential to eradicate the disruptive influ-
ence that defensive incorporations have on the effective implementation of comprehensive
plans.
"8 See Mandelker, supra note 64, at 276-77. Most of the state incorporation statutes
require only that certain procedural standards be met prior to approval of the incorporation
petition. Id.
10 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-101 (West Supp. 1982-1983). Although the Arizona incor-
poration statute appears to contain more than mere procedural requirements, it is suggested
that its standards are rather broad, and, thus, open to dispute. See id. For examples of
statutes that do not set forth even minimum substantive standards for incorporation, see
ALA. CODE § 11-41-1 (Supp. 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, §§ 20-21 (1957); N.Y. VILLAGE
LAW §§ 2-200 to -202 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1981-1982).
100 See IND. CODE §§ 36-5-1-2, -8 (1981). The petition for incorporation in Indiana must
state that:
(1) the territory is urban in character;
(2) the territory is reasonably compact and contiguous;
(3) there is enough undeveloped land in the territory to permit reasonable growth
of the town; and
(4) incorporation is in the best interests of the citizens of the territory.
Id. § 36-5-1-2(a). In addition, the petitioners must provide a statement to the county execu-
tive setting forth the property valuations of the territory, the municipal services to be pro-
vided and their costs, and the proposed tax rate. Id. § 36-5-1-3(3)-(5). For other examples of
substantive incorporation statutes, see IowA CODE ANN. §§ 368.11, .17 (West 1976 & Supp.
1982-1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 66.014, .016 (West Supp. 1982-1983).
101 IND. CODE § 36-5-1-2(a)(4) (1981).
102 Id. § 36-5-1-8(1)-(6) (listing the conditions that must exist before the county execu-
tive may approve an incorporation).
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a finding by the county executive, based upon an evaluation of
specified criteria, that the incorporation is in the "best interests"
of the territory. 0 3 Similarly, the statute enacted by the Town of
Ramapo contains several substantive provisions which are designed
to prevent municipal incorporations that might disrupt or destroy
Ramapo's comprehensive plan.104 It is submitted, however, that the
town's "over-all public interest" requirement, with no attendant
guidelines by which the town supervisor is to make his determina-
tion, renders its statute vulnerable to attack for arbitrariness. As in
Marcus v. Baron, the supervisor's denial of an incorporation,
though based upon legitimate concerns, might be viewed as an at-
tempt by one governmental entity to preclude the creation of an-
other for purely parochial reasons.10 5 Therefore, while the Indiana
and Ramapo statutes may serve to reduce the probability of defen-
sive incorporation, it is suggested that a more stringent standard of
review is necessary to eradicate the potential abuse of the munici-
pal form of government.
PROPOSED MODEL INCORPORATION STATUTE
In this section of the Note a model incorporation statute is
proffered. The statute combines the best elements of the existing
statutes of several states and sets forth a series of procedural and
substantive requirements that must be satisfied prior to approval
103 Id. As a prerequisite to the attainment of municipal status, the county executive
must find that the proposed incorporation is in the "best interests" of the subject territory,
based upon the following criteria:
(A) the expected growth and governmental needs of the area surrounding the
proposed town;
(B) the extent to which another unit can more adequately and economically pro-
vide essential services and functions; and
(C) the extent to which the incorporators are willing to enter into agreements...
with the largest neighboring municipality.
Id.
104 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
100 See Marcus v. Baron, 84 App. Div. 2d 118, 138-39, 445 N.Y.S.2d 587, 601 (2d Dep't
1981) (Hopkins, J., dissenting). In Marcus, the dissent urged that the question whether
Ramapo's incorporation statute is valid should be left to the legislature, contending:
[T]he legislature might well consider that to allow towns to adopt local laws rais-
ing a variety of conditions to the creation of villages in addition to those imposed
by the Legislature, would unduly interfere with the desirable standard of uniform-
ity of method for the creation of villages throughout the State, and would inaugu-
rate a parochial resistance by towns to new villages through the formation of diffi-
cult or oppressive conditions.
Id. (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
19821
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of an incorporation petition. If the petitioning community-fails to
adhere to the statutory requirements, the reviewing government
officials would be required to reject the proposed incorporation.
The community thus would remain part of the larger governmental
entity, thereby preventing further governmental fragmentation and
mandating compliance with any existing comprehensive plan in the
area.
§ 1. Petition For Municipal Incorporation
(a) Every petition for incorporation shall:
(1) bear a number of signatures equivalent to 30% of all
votes cast from the unincorporated area proposed for mu-
nicipal status at the last congressional election, or 3,000
signatures, whichever is less, except that there must be at
least ten signatures from each of at least 50% of the vot-
ing districts within the area. Only the signatures of those
registered voters who are residents of this territory are to
be included for purposes of this section;'06
(2) state the name of the proposed municipality.
(b) Every petition for incorporation shall be accompanied by the
following:
(1) a general statement of the proposal,'0 7 including the
petitioners' motives in seeking to incorporate;
(2) a report of an accurate and current census taken of
the resident population of the territory which shall show
the number of persons then belonging to every family in
such territory;105
(3) a map of the territory;10 9
(4) a report of the assessed valuation of platted and un-
platted land within the territory;1' 0
(5) a report describing existing municipal services, in-
cluding but not limited to sewage treatment and disposal,
water supply, police and fire protection, and health
services;
(6) a statement of intent to comply with any town,
county, state, or regional comprehensive plan then in ex-
istence and covering the subject territory;
(7) a report enumerating the present and potential
100 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-101 (Supp. 1981).
107 See IowA CODE ANN. § 368.11 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982-1983).
108 See Wyo. STAT. § 15-1-202(ii) (1977).
100 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 368.11 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982-1983).
110 See id.
"I See id.; VA. CODE §§ 15.1-875 to -876, -881 (1981).
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sources of tax revenue and the projected tax rate; 12
(8) a copy of the notice required to be posted and an affi-
davit showing compliance with the posting requirements
of section 4.113
§ 2. Dismissal of Petition
(a) If the petition for incorporation fails to meet the require-
ments of the preceding section, the board of commissioners [or
similar governing body] shall:
(1) dismiss the petition; and
(2) file for inclusion in the record a statement relating
the reasons for the dismissal; and
(3) give prompt notice to the parties of its decision.
(b) If the petition for incorporation is not dismissed, the board
must within a reasonable time initiate proceedings to determine
the merits of the proposed incorporation.1 14
§ 3. Formation of Committee
(a) Upon the board's decision to initiate proceedings toward the
incorporation of a territory, the board shall designate local repre-
sentatives to serve with board members as a committee to con-
sider the proposal. Each local representative must be a qualified
elector of the territory he or she represents. The board shall di-
rect the appointment of one local representative from each town
or county involved. Each local representative serving on the com-
mittee shall receive reimbursement for any actual and necessary
expenses spent in performance of committee duties." 5
(b) Two board members and at least one-half of the appointed
local representatives are required for a quorum of the
committee." 6
111 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.016(2)(a) (West 1965). It is submitted that full disclosure
of present and potential sources of tax revenue will provide the reviewing body with the
information necessary to determine whether the proposed municipality would be financially
capable of supporting adequate governmental services. In addition, it is suggested that a
report of the projected tax rate would enable the reviewers to surmise the type of residents
or businesses that the incorporators are attempting to attract or exclude.
"' See Wyo. STAT. § 15-1-204 (1977).
1M See IOWA CODE ANN. § 368.12 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982-1983).
"I See id. § 368.14. It is suggested that the formation of a committee comprised of
members of the local governing body and other designated local representatives will serve to
maintain sufficient resident input into the determination of the merits of the proposed in-
corporation. The proffered statute, by mandating that local representatives receive reim-
bursement for their expenses, seemingly would encourage active participation in the incor-
poration proceedings and deter allegiance to special interest groups.
11' See id.
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§ 4. Notice and Public Hearing
(a) A copy of the petition for incorporation, the general state-
ment of the proposal, and the map of the subject territory shall
be filed in the office of the county clerk of the county in which the
territory is located.117
(b) A public hearing shall be conducted by the committee as soon
as reasonably practicable after the proceedings for incorporation
are initiated.11
(c) Notice of the time and place of the public hearing shall be
served upon any state or regional planning authority, and upon
any town, village, or county board of commissioners whose area of
responsibility may be affected by the proposed incorporation.' 1 9
In addition, such notice shall be posted in three public places in
the subject territory and shall be published for one week in a
newspaper having a general circulation in the territory.1 20 Such
notice also shall include a statement of compliance with the filing
requirements of subsection (a) of this section.
(d) In conducting the public hearing, the committee shall have
the power to subpoena witnesses and documents relevant to the
proposal and shall accept briefs and hear arguments of interested
parties.121
§ 5. Committee Decision
Following the completion of a full and fair public hearing on the
merits of the proposal, the committee shall decide whether or not
the incorporation would be in the best interests of the subject ter-
ritory, the town or county of which it forms a part, and the sur-
rounding region.1 22 Approval of the proposed incorporation is con-
ditioned upon the committee's decision. A determination that an
incorporation would be in the best interests of the aforemen-
'17 See generally Wyo. STAT. § 15-1-203 (1977) (copy of survey, map, and census shall
be filed with the county clerk).
18 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 368.15 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982-1983). It is submitted that a
public hearing on the merits of the proposed incorporation is essential to ensure that all
interested and affected persons are given an opportunity to be heard. Such a hearing thus
promotes a responsive body politic, one of the desirous characteristics of local government.
See generally Grant, supra note 72, at 47-50 (one of the primary reasons for a community's
incorporation is the governmental independence that is obtained by incorporation).
19 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 368.15 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982-1983). The requirement that
notice of the public hearing be given to any interested planning or governing authorities
apparently ensures that the residents of the surrounding areas of the territory will be repre-
sented at the public hearing. This, in turn, would avoid a strictly parochial approach to the
determination of the merits of the proposed incorporation.
120 See id.; Wyo. STAT. § 15-1-203 (1977).
'z' See IOWA CODE ANN. § 368.15 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982-1983).
122 See IND. CODE § 36-5-1-8(6) (1981); supra note 100.
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tioned areas must be supported by the following:
(a) a favorable recommendation of the state or regional planning
authority for the area, including a statement of compliance with
any comprehensive land use plans then in existence in the area;123
(b) a finding that the level of governmental services needed or
desired by the residents of the territory can be adequately pro-
vided by the proposed municipality,12" such services including but
not limited to the following:
(1) police and fire protection;
(2) street construction, maintenance, and lighting;
(3) sanitary and storm sewers and garbage disposal;
(4) health protection;
(5) parks and recreation;
(6) schools and education;
(7) planning, zoning, and subdivision control;
(8) utility services;12
(c) a finding that the services required by the residents of the
subject territory cannot be provided by alternate means, such
means including but not limited to annexation, the establishment
of a sanitary district, or extension of existing services provided by
the county in which the territory is located."2"
(d) a finding that the proposed incorporation would not substan-
tially hinder the solution of governmental problems, financial or
otherwise, affecting the remainder of the town or county from
which the territory is to be incorporated, as well as the surround-
ing region;1
27
(e) a finding that the present and potential sources of tax reve-
nue would be sufficient to meet the anticipated cost of adequate
municipal services at a local tax rate which compares favorably
with the tax rate imposed in a similar area for the same level of
services."'
'" See IOWA CODE ANN. § 368.16 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982-1983). It is submitted that
the requirement of a statement of compliance with any existing comprehensive plans in the
area ensures that defensive incorporations designed to circumvent such plan will be pre-
vented. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
11 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.016(2)(b) (West 1965).
, See IND. CODE § 36-5-1-8(4) (1981).
, See VA. CODE § 15.1-967 (1981).
1"7 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.016(2)(c)-(d) (West 1965). The committee should be re-
quired to examine the possibility that a proposed incorporation would aggravate existing
problems in the larger area of which the territory is a part, as well as the possibility that
such incorporation would thwart any efforts being made to alleviate these problems. See
generally Marcus v. Baron, 84 App. Div. 2d 118, 128-30, 445 N.Y.S.2d 587, 595-96 (2d Dep't
1981); supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
"S See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.016(2)(a) (West 1965).
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§ 6. Appeal
A surrounding village, town, or county, or a resident or property
owner in the territory involved, may appeal a decision of the
board or committee to the court of a county which contains a por-
tion of any territory involved. Appeal must be filed within thirty
(30) days of the filing of the committee's decision. Appeal of a
committee's approval of an incorporation does not stay the crea-
tion of the municipality. 129
Assuming that a substantive incorporation scheme is drafted,
the issue arises as to which level of the legislature is best suited to
enact and enforce such a statute. The resolution of this question
seemingly hinges upon the broader inquiry into whether land use
planning itself should be handled on a local, state, or national
level. Historically, land use decisions have been made at the local
level, and such decisions have received strong deferential treat-
ment by the courts.130 The current political emphasis on decentral-
ization and return to local control may serve to continue this prac-
tice.131 It should be noted, however, that local autonomy in the
land use area may result in the abuse of home rule powers.132
Demonstrative of a locality's abuse of power is the practice of
exclusionary zoning.133 Motivated by prejudice or its desire to
maintain the status quo or increase its revenues, a local govern-
ment often enacts ordinances that are designed to exclude, for ex-
ample, unwanted public facilities or low-cost housing.'3 Such leg-
129 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 368.22 (West Supp. 1982-1983).
See supra note 8.
231 See Delogu, supra note 83, at 16. It has been argued that traditional local autonomy
in the land use realm has, in fact, been strengthened by the nation's growing dissatisfaction
with big government. Id. Nevertheless, the states recently have become more involved in
land use planning. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
11I See 5 P. RoHAN, supra note 21, § 33.01[1], at 33-4, -5; Freilich & Larson, Conflicts of
Interest: A Model Statutory Proposal for the Regulation Of Municipal Transactions, 38
UMKC L. REV. 373, 375 (1970); Zoning, supra note 2, at 1590-92. Most of the criticism of
local autonomy in the land use area centers on the tendency of local governments to be
concerned primarily with fiscal matters and only secondarily with environmental, housing,
and other regional needs. See Zoning, supra note 2, at 1590-92.
1" See Heyman, supra note 52, at 53-54. The utilization of local land use control as an
exclusionary tool has been widespread. Id. at 54. One commentator, in attempting to explain
the reasons for the desire to live in a "homogeneous" area, stated that "many whites want to
live apart from blacks. . . ; many blacks want to live apart from whites; many middle- and
upper-income people want to live apart from lower-income people; ethnic enclaves have a
tendency to persist, for both inclusionary and exclusionary reasons." Id. at 53.
114 See 5 P. RoHmN, supra note 21, § 33.01[1], at 33-5 n.5; Zoning, supra note 2, at 1590.
While local ordinances frequently are designed to exclude undesirable uses or projects, they
often make special exceptions for businesses and industries so as to increase tax revenues
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islation either may ensure that a project will never reach fruition
or, at the very least, transfer the responsibility for a needed devel-
opment to another governmental entity.135 To be sure, the range of
activities and types of development that have been the targets of
exclusionary zoning are expansive."'
Local control over land use decisions has been criticized on the
additional ground that the local decisionmakers lack planning ex-
pertise.13 7 Because their decisions seriously may affect environmen-
tal concerns of the region or state, as well as those of the particular
locality, the officials' lack of expertise may disrupt or destroy fu-
ture land use planning efforts. 3 " Accordingly, it is suggested that,
prior to enacting a comprehensive plan or making any significant
land use decision, the local government should employ planning
experts to draft a plan or ordinance that will protect local interests
and minimize the adverse impact upon surrounding areas. Indeed,
this approach to local land use planning was utilized by the Town
of Ramapo," 9 which itself has become "'renowned in planning cir-
cles throughout the United States for the consistency of its policies
and the farsighted planning and development programs which it
has initiated.' ,14o
and jobs for the community. See 5 P. ROHAN, supra note 21, § 33.01[1], at 33-5 n.5; Zoning,
supra note 2, at 1590.
136 See Delogu, supra note 83, at 17.
16 See, e.g., Deerfield Medical Center v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 330-32
(5th Cir. 1981) (abortion clinic); Crow v. Brown, 457 F.2d 788, 789-90 (5th Cir. 1972) (low-
income housing); Scherrer v. Board of County Comm'rs, 201 Kan. 424, 441 P.2d 901, 901
(1968) (mobile home park); Mayor v. State, 281 Md. 217, 222-24, 378 A.2d 1326, 1328-30
(1977) (prison); Fitchburg Hous. Auth. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 380 Mass. 869, 406
N.E.2d 1006, 1010 (1980) (home for retarded persons); Town of Oronoco v. City of Roches-
ter, 293 Minn. 468, 471-72, 197 N.W.2d 426, 429-30 (1972) (waste treatment plant).
137 See Freilich & Larson, supra note 132, at 375. Usually, the majority of local officials
are merely "part-time" leaders, and only about one-half of them receive a salary for their
services. Id. As a result of the informality of the local officials' position, as well as their
general lack of professional training, they frequently are subject to influence by private in-
terests. Id.
13 See Comment, The Duty of a Municipality to Consider the Environmental Effect
of its Land Use Planning Decisions Upon the Regional Welfare: Judicial Balancing in the
Absence of Interjurisdictional Planning Legislation, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1253, 1271 (1979).
The environmental effects of a particular land use decision may be felt beyond municipal
borders and should, therefore, be considered by the decisionmakers. Id.
13 See Freilich, supra note 58, at 123-24. In addition to hiring knowledgeable planners,
the Town of Ramapo commissioned several studies to provide information on sewerage and
drainage systems in order to provide for maximum development. Id. at 124.
Mo Marcus v. Baron, 84 App. Div. 2d 118, 127, 445 N.Y.S.2d 587, 594 (2d Dep't 1981)
(quoting John P. McAlevey, former Town Supervisor of the Town of Ramapo).
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The primary advantage of land use planning on the local level
is that local officials, elected by the people who will be most di-
rectly affected by their decisions, have the power to legislate for
the community's needs. 41 Nevertheless, the states increasingly
have become involved in land use planning so as to curb ad hoc,
local decisionmaking in this area.1 42 Although state involvement
may conflict with the concept of municipal home rule,4" the states
have the power to preempt local governments in matters of state or
general concern. 44 Thus, land use decisions that have effects be-
yond municipal boundaries are properly within state control.1 45 In
fact, state preemption already has been successfully implemented
in several areas involving environmental concerns, where "state-
wide treatment" was deemed necessary. 141
Those states that have become involved in land use planning
have taken divergent approaches.14" For instance, California, by re-
quiring the development of local comprehensive plans, is involved
directly in local land use planning. Zoning ordinances and subdivi-
sion approvals must be consistent with the state-mandated general
city or county comprehensive plan14  and, in the housing area,
141 See Vestal, supra note 9, at 174. When a local government effects a particular meas-
ure, residents of the community are reassured that they retain some control over the af-
fected aspect of their lives, and that at least one level of government is responsive to their
needs. See id.
141 See C. WF&vn & R. BABCOCK, supra note 68, at 246. It has been noted that recently
there has been a shift from local control to state control in the area of land use regulation.
Id.; see Comment, supra note 55, at 1154-55.
'4' See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
144 See, e.g., Mental Health Ass'n of Union County, Inc. v. City of Elizabeth, 180 N.J.
Super. 304, 309, 434 A.2d 688, 690 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981) (New Jersey statute "has
preempted the field of zoning for community residences for the developmentally disabled");
Township of Little Falls v. Bardin, 173 N.J. Super. 397, 412-13, 414 A.2d 559, 566-67 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1979) (state law preempted local law regarding solid waste disposal because of
the need for statewide treatment). See generally Andersen, supra note 65, at 147-48 (those
matters that can be characterized as strictly "local" are decreasing).
14" See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926) ("the general
public interest [may] so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality
would not be allowed to stand in the way"); Comment, supra note 138, at 1260. It is submit-
ted that the limiting language of municipal home rule provisions and the enabling acts,
together with the Supreme Court's recognition of a "general public interest," would aid in
defeating any challenge to state action in the land use realm on the basis of a conflict with
home rule powers.
140 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
See generally 5 P. RoHAN, supra note 21, § 33.03, at 33-56; Sullivan & Kressel,
supra note 28, at 66.
18 See CALIFORNIA PLANNING LAW, supra note 30, at 3-4. California requires that
mandatory comprehensive plans contain nine elements, with the inclusion of additional ele-
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there is an affirmative duty to consider regional needs.149 Several
jurisdictions, moreover, have instituted land use planning on a
statewide level, with administration and review conducted by a
state agency. 150 Oregon's system of planning,1 51 for example, in-
cludes mandatory local comprehensive plans that comply with
statewide goals and are reviewed and enforced by a state agency
comprised of seven governor-appointed citizens.15 2 The Oregon
scheme successfully has withstood challenges based upon alleged
conflicts with home rule provisions, allegations of unconstitutional
taking, and claims that it involved an unlawful delegation of
authority. 5 3
ments at the locality's option. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65302-65303 (Deering 1979 & Supp.
1982); CALIFORNIA PLANNING LAW, supra note 30, at 5. The required elements deal with land
use, circulation, housing, conservation, open space, seismic safety, noise, scenic highways,
and safety. See CALIFORNIA PLANNING LAW, supra note 30, at 5. Among the optional ele-
ments are recreation, transit, and historical preservation. Id. at 6.
149 CALIFORNIA PLANNING LAW, supra note 30, at 10-a. The housing element to be in-
cluded in local comprehensive plans has been one of the most controversial in California's
land use legislation. Id. As of 1981, the local government must assess the housing needs of
all of the economic classes in the community and must develop a plan to meet these needs.
Id. The community's "fair share" of the regional housing need, as determined by an inde-
pendent council of governments, is a factor that must be considered in the evaluation of
these housing needs. Id. The locality's program subsequently "is developed by identifying
adequate sites for a variety of types of housing for all income levels, by addressing govern-
mental constraints to the development of housing, by conserving and improving the condi-
tion of existing affordable housing stock and by promoting housing opportunities for all
persons in the community." Id.
8' See CoLo. Rnv. STAT. §§ 24-65-101 to -104, 24-65.1-101 to -502 (1974 & Supp. 1981);
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 205-1 to -37 (1968 & Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 3310-
3314 (1981); id. tit. 12, §§ 685-A to -C (1981 & West Supp.); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005-.650
(1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6092 (Supp. 1982). As of early 1981, state legislation
mandating land use planning had been enacted by 18 states. Mandelker & Netter, Compre-
hensive Plans and the Law, in LAND USE LAW: ISSUES FOR THE EIGHTIES 55, 70 (E. Netter
ed. 1981).
"' See HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 8.02, at 112. Local governments in Oregon retain
their decisionmaking powers as to land use provided that their decisions comply with the
goals set forth by the Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC). See id.
The goals are not site-specific and are designed to be flexible. Id. § 8.06, at 117.
..2 See id. § 8.05, at 116. The state agency in Oregon that reviews and enforces the local
comprehensive plans is the LCDC, and it consists of seven citizens. Id. The seven citizens
are governor-appointed and, after senate confirmation, serve staggered 4-year terms. Id.
"' See Fifth Ave. Corp. v. Washington County, 282 Or. 591, 613, 581 P.2d 50, 62-63
(1978) (Oregon scheme is not an unconstitutional "taking"); City of La Grande v. Public
Employees Retirement Bd., 281 Or. 137, 156, 576 P.2d 1204, 1215 (1978) (two principles
applicable to the determination whether state legislation encroaches upon municipal home
rule powers); Meyer v. Lord, 37 Or. App. 59, 64-65, 586 P.2d 367, 371-73 (Ct. App. 1978)
(authority of state agency to set planning goals upheld). It has been stated that as a result
of Oregon's land use legislation, "[t]he state is a better place to live now and in the future
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A less comprehensive alternative that a state may choose is
selective land use control. 1 4 Florida's planning program, for exam-
ple, is designed to protect "areas of critical state concern" and to
govern those developments that have a "regional impact.' 1 55 While
the state provides a number of planning guidelines to be followed
for such areas, land use decisions that do not affect either of these
two concerns are made at the local level.5 6
Finally, a state may assert direct control over a particular re-
gion within the state which is deemed to be in need of special pro-
tection. In New York, for example, the Adirondack Park Agency
was created 57 so as to obviate the uncontrolled growth and devel-
opment of approximately six million acres of wilderness area which
was under the jurisdiction of 119 separate governmental units. 58
In order to accomplish this goal, the state empowered the agency
to "adopt and implement a comprehensive land use control system
for the dual purpose of preserving and using the vast resources of
the area."'159 This approach has been challenged unsuccessfully as
an unconstitutional infringement of the local government's home
because it [is] able to move beyond local politics and deal with the problems associated with
growth and pollution in a rational and balanced way." HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 8.15, at
125.
15. See generally 5 P. ROHAN, supra note 21, § 33.05. The American Law Institute's
Model Land Development Code would extend a state agency's land use authority to areas of
"critical state concern" and "developments of regional impact." MODEL LAND DEV. CODE art.
7 commentary at 253 (1976). The draftsmen believed that such a restriction would balance
the need for state participation in land use planning with the desire for local autonomy. See
id. Although the Model Code has been adopted by several states, the omissions or modifica-
tions of its various sections have lessened the impact that it otherwise would have had on
land use planning. See Comment, supra note 55, at 1174-75.
15 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.05-.06 (West Supp. 1982). A "critical area" has been
described as "a geographical area possessing unique characteristics which make it of signifi-
cant interest to inhabitants of the state or region beyond the boundaries of local govern-
ments within whose jurisdictions part of the area is located." Pelham, Regulating Areas of
Critical State Concern: Florida and the Model Code, 18 URB. L. ANN. 3, 4 (1980) (footnotes
omitted). Florida's land use legislation was enacted in reaction to a severe drought that
extended to three populous counties and was caused by the drainage, dredging, and filling of
area wetlands. See 5 P. ROHAN, supra note 21, § 33.05[2], at 33-110 (footnotes omitted). The
legislature subsequently appointed a task force to devise a management system that would
avoid similar problems in the future. See id.
I" See 5 P. ROHAN, supra note 21, § 33.05[2], at 33-110; Pelham, supra note 155, at 4.
157 See N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 801 (McKinney Supp. 1972-1978); see also 1977 Mass. Acts
1083-86 (creating the Martha's Vineyard Commission); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13: 17-1 (West
1979) (creation of the Hackensack Meadowland District).
"I See Pelham, supra note 155, at 6.
159 Id. at 6-7. Any comprehensive land use system adopted and implemented by the
governing agency is binding upon all affected local governments. See id. at 7.
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rule powers. 160 Seemingly, therefore, the land use legislation
adopted by the various states illustrates the heightened awareness
of the need for some form of regulation or guidance at other than
the local level.161
The recognition of the need for planning that considers the
effects of land use decisions on areas beyond municipal borders
also has brought about a call for involvement on the federal
level.16 2 In the early 1970's, national legislation that would have
provided for considerable state involvement in planning and fed-
eral review of land use programs was introduced in the House of
Representatives. 163 Because it was feared that every land use deci-
sion eventually would be subject to federal control, however, such
legislation never was passed.16 4 Notwithstanding the lack of com-
prehensive federal legislation, there are several national programs
that indirectly require local planners to consider the ramifications
of their land use decisions.16 5 Mass transit as well as water and
sewer projects, for example, are entitled to federal funding pro-
vided that a regional planning body for the particular area exists
160 See Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 497, 362 N.E.2d 581, 584, 393
N.Y.S.2d 949, 954 (1977); Comment, supra note 65, at 399.
"', See Mandelker, supra note 15, at 952. It is generally agreed that all local autonomy
in the land use area should not be forfeited. Id. Indeed, local officials should retain the
authority to make general decisions that primarily will affect only the immediate commu-
nity. Id. When matters of statewide or regional concern must be dealt with, however, local
governments are seen as inappropriate entities to resolve the problems. See id. at 952-53;
Zoning, supra note 2, at 1592 (1978).
162 See C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, supra note 68, at 244-45. The increased state involve-
ment in the land use area was accompanied by a movement to institute some form of federal
land use program. See id. The mounting pressure for higher governmental participation
caused "[s]uburban municipalities [to feel] about as comfortable as a capitalist in the wan-
ing days of Romanov Russia as the reports of their land use excesses and the news of the
'Quiet Revolution' spread at the same time." Id. at 245.
1M3 See R. LINOWES & D. ALLENSWORTH, THE POLITICS OF LAND-UsE LAW 1 (1976). The
proposed national land use legislation was "to be exercised over 'critical areas' in the states
or 'areas of more than local concern'. . . ." Id. at 2. Not so suprisingly, "[g]iven this 'defini-
tion,' there was in reality no way of knowing what a critical area was and therefore no hope
of limiting the controls therein." Id.
' See supra note 163. It has been suggested that pervasive federal involvement in the
land use area is undesirable because local resistance to such extensive intervention would be
substantial. See Zoning, supra note 2, at 1592 ("the regulated landowners might feel that
they have more of a voice in state, as compared to federal, decisionmaking, and as a result
acceptance and compliance might be better assured by state control").
165 See, e.g., Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980). As of 1976, there were some 32 separate federal programs that
sought to impose regional concerns on local planning. See Godschalk & Brower, Beyond the
City Limits: Regional Equity as an Emerging Issue, 15 URB. L. ANN. 159, 161-63 (1978).
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and reviews the applications for federal assistance. 68 Similarly, the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) "701 program" provides federal assistance with respect to
various state, local, and regional planning activities.167
In sum, it is clear that the relative advantages and disadvan-
tages of each form of governmental control must be weighed prior
to determining the most appropriate vehicle to effect and imple-
ment land use decisions. It has been suggested that although spe-
cial interests are influential at the local level, such interests may be
present at the state or national level as well. 168 It is submitted,
nonetheless, that in order to diminish ad hoc, parochial land use
decisionmaking and to promote rational, regional planning, state
intervention, including a provision for mandatory local comprehen-
sive planning with state agency reviews of the adopted plan and its
implementation, is necessary.6 9 This, it is suggested, permits the
continuance of local control over matters having strictly local
ramifications, yet guards against the usurpation of regional and
state interests. It is submitted, moreover, that a state program for
managing land use planning should include a substantive incorpo-
ration statute similar to the one proposed in this Note. As sug-
gested earlier, such a statute would prevent defensive incorpora-
tions designed to circumvent the mandatory comprehensive plan,
as well as curtail the further proliferation of governmental
fragmentation.
" Bagne, supra note 8, at 295.
.67 40 U.S.C. § 461 (Supp. IV 1980); 5 P. ROHAN, supra note 21, § 33.01[1], at 33-11
n.21.
168 See R. LijowEs & D. ALLENSWORTH, supra note 163, at 3. Special interest groups are
influential at all levels of government. Id. It is interesting to note that members of the land
development industry were among the proponents of national land use legislation. Id. at 6.
169 See Mandelker, supra note 15, at 951-53. It appears that state participation in land
use decisions that have an impact beyond local borders would not be without historical
counterparts. One commentator has observed:
One of the first examples of this was the state participation in highway con-
struction and regulation. As soon as the motor vehicle became a significant factor,
there was pressure for the formation of a state agency to take control of the high-
way system. Within recent years the same pressures have been felt in the area of
public education. Matters which formerly were left to local units are now under
the control of larger regional units. The same development has occurred in police
work .... In matters of pollution control we are also moving from the local enti-
ties to broader statewide agencies.
Vestal, supra note 9, at 174 (footnotes omitted). It is submitted that the problem of ad hoc,
parochial land use planning and government fragmentation similarly are deserving of state
involvement.
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THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
Although substantial state involvement is the contemplated
ideal, land use planning continues to be conducted at the local
level in a majority of the states.170 Additionally, most states lack
the substantive incorporation statute necessary to stem govern-
mental fragmentation and to promote effective comprehensive
planning.17 1 Hence, the burden of determining the validity of land
use decisions often is placed upon the judiciary. Faced with this
task, the Supreme Court, once hesitant to become involved in zon-
ing and land use disputes at all,172 has been reluctant to question
the judgment of local officials in these areas. 7 In the recent case
of Agins v. City of Tiburon,1 74 for instance, the Court, confronted
with the question whether certain zoning regulations amounted to
an unconstitutional taking, stated that ordinances "are exercises of
the city's police power to protect the residents . . . from the in
effects of urbanization. Such governmental purposes long have
been recognized as legitimate." 17 5 By deferring to the judgment of
the local officials and sustaining the validity of the zoning scheme,
the Court clearly indicated its unwillingness to decide land use
controversies. 76
The inactive review policy espoused by the Supreme Court
170 See Vestal, supra note 9, at 161.
171 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
172 R. FRmLICH & E. STUHLER, supra note 46, at 3.
173 See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52-53 (1976); Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 4 (1974); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 396-97 (1926). In Belle Terre, the Court indicated that the state's police power, as
delegated to its local governments, permits the enactments of zoning ordinances that are
intended to preserve the aesthetic values of a community. 416 U.S. at 9. In upholding an
ordinance that restricted all land use to one-family dwellings, the Court stated that "[t]he
police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample
to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people." Id.
274 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
175 Id.. at 261 (footnotes and citations omitted). The plaintiff in Agins purchased 5 acres
of vacant land intending to use it for residential development. Id. at 257. Subsequent to the
purchase, and pursuant to California's statutory mandate, the city of Tiburon prepared a
general plan governing land use in the community. Id. Various local ordinances adopted in
accordance with this plan effectively modified existing zoning regulations and restricted the
plaintiff to the construction of five single-family dwellings on his property. Id. The Court,
reasoning that the plaintiff had not been deprived of all reasonable use of his property,
rejected the plaintiff's contention that there had been an unconstitutional taking of his land.
Id. at 262.
1' See id. at 260-61 (a court does not look beyond the issue of the proper exercise of
the town's authority under its police power).
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and a large majority of the state courts reflects the belief that the
legislature is, perhaps, better suited to regulate the area of land
use planning. 1 7 This view is shared even by the few courts which
have played an active role in this area.1 8 Both factions seemingly
recognize that the legislature is not limited to the resolution of a
narrow issue, but rather may develop a "broad multifaceted ap-
proach"'17 to land use problems. Additionally, the legislature typi-
cally has access to a "much broader range of informational sources
and expertise" from which it can fashion a solution and is "often
better equipped to handle politically sensitive issues."''8 0
It is suggested, however, that in the absence of substantive
state guidance, courts examining the validity of local land use en-
actments should look beyond the specific legislation in question to
the policy reasons underlying its enactment and to the regional
general welfare.18' This judicial standard of review was exemplified
in Marcus v. Baron. In that case, the court, upholding the validity
of the Town of Ramapo's village incorporation statute, considered
177 See, e.g., Copley Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. City of Aurora, 99 IlM. App. 3d 217, 221, 425
N.E.2d 493, 496-97 (App. Ct. 1981); Munch v. City of Mott, 311 N.W.2d 17, 22 (N.D. 1981).
In Copley, the court defined the judicial role in land use regulation in the following manner.
It is primarily the province of the municipal body to determine the use and
purpose to which property may be devoted, and it is neither the province nor the
duty of the courts to interfere with the discretion with which such bodies are
vested unless the legislative action of the municipality is shown to be arbitrary,
capricious or unrelated to public health, safety and morals.
99 Ill. App. 3d at 221, 425 N.E.2d at 497 (citation omitted).
18 Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 505 n.10, 371 A.2d
1192, 1237 n.10 (1977) (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (in the ab-
sence of remedial legislative action, courts must act to end exclusionary land use policies).
"I' See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
'80 Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 505 n.10, 371 A.2d
1192, 1237 n.10 (1977) (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"' See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 179-80, 336 A.2d 713, 727-28 (zoning ordinance invalidated because it failed to provide
for regional general welfare and regional needs), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Marcus v.
Baron, 84 App. Div. 2d 118, 131-32, 445 N.Y.S.2d 587, 597 (2d Dep't 1981) (town incorpora-
tion statute upheld as a legitimate planning measure that took regional needs into account).
Regional general welfare has evolved into an aspect of substantive due process. R. FaaluCH
& E. STUHLER, supra note 46, at 13. The regional needs approach requires that "an exercise
of zoning authority must be in accordance with the needs and welfare of the state as a whole
rather than limited to the territorial confines of the jurisdiction itself." Id. at 13-14. Such
needs must be considered by the local government "[s]ince the state has delegated its power
to the municipality... " Id. Several cases illustrate the application of the regional general
welfare approach. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481,
531-36, 371 A.2d 1192, 1216-19 (1977); Borough of Allendale v. Township Comm., 177 N.J.
Super. 230, 233, 426 A.2d 73, 75 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Berenson v. Town of New
Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 109-10, 341 N.E.2d 236, 241-42, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 680 (1975).
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the substantial policy reasons behind the enactment of the statute,
including the desire to prevent defensive incorporations that might
disrupt the planning efforts embodied in Ramapo's comprehensive
plan.182 Furthermore, noted the court, the effects of the incorpora-
tion statute on the entire community, not merely the unincorpo-
rated areas, must be evaluated. 83 It is submitted that the courts'
employment of this two-pronged approach ensures that, while leg-
islation that merely promotes parochial interests will be struck
down, the rational and regionally responsive planning schemes of
local communities will not be invalidated unnecessarily.
While a court may invalidate a local enactment as exclusion-
ary or contrary to the regional welfare, there nevertheless remains
the possibility that such a determination will provide little relief to
the challenging party. Indeed, this situation might result from the
municipality's ability to delay or prevent the proposed develop-
ment or project."" To remedy this injustice, several courts have
transgressed their traditional role in land use disputes and granted
these plaintiffs affirmative relief,1 85 thereby preventing further
182 84 App. Div. 2d at 118, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 594-97.
183 See id.
I" See Hartman, Beyond Invalidation: The Judicial Power to Zone, 9 URB. L. ANN.
159, 161-62 (1975). The Pennsylvania case of Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395
(1970), illustrates the ordeal that a "successful" plaintiff must endure once the challenged
ordinance has been invalidated. In Girsh, the plaintiff wanted to erect an apartment build-
ing on his property, but was prevented from doing so by the township's zoning ordinances.
Id. at 240, 263 A.2d at 396. The court's invalidation of the ordinance was followed by a
chaotic series of events. The town rezoned the area for apartments, but excluded the plain-
tiff's property. See Hartman, supra, at 161-62. The plaintiff then sought unsuccessfully to
get a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of a permit. Id. The town subsequently
attempted to condemn the plaintiff's property for public purposes. Id. The plaintiff thereaf-
ter commenced a suit to prevent the condemnation and to challenge the town's various ac-
tions. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally ordered the issuance of building permits,
id., but unfortunately, after 5 years of litigation, the development of the plaintiff's property
was rendered economically unfeasible, id. at 162.
185 See, e.g., City of Birmingham v. Morris, 396 So. 2d 53, 58 (Ala. 1981); Kruvant v.
Mayor, 82 N.J. 435, 445, 414 A.2d 9, 14 (1980). In Morris, the plaintiffs were owners of two
adjoining lots that were zoned for multiple dwelling residential use. 396 So. 2d at 54. The
plaintiffs' application for a change of the zoning classification to "neighborhood business"
was denied by both the planning and zoning commission and the city council, notwithstand-
ing that several years earlier, the city council had approved a similar change for the prem-
ises located immediately west of the subject property. Id. at 55-56. The court affirmed the
trial court's order, thereby enjoining the city from enforcing the zoning ordinances as they
affected the plaintiffs' property and ordering the approval of the plaintiffs' application. Id.
at 54, 58.
In Kruvant, the plaintiff desired to build 61 garden apartment units in a tract zoned
only for one-family homes. 82 N.J. at 436, 414 A.2d at 9. Although the board of adjustment
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abuse of municipal powers. 18 Although such an active judicial role
is somewhat problematic, 187 it appears to be the sole remaining
weapon of a "successful" challenger in his battle against parochial-
ism. It is suggested, therefore, that when a municipality uses its
zoning powers in such a manner as to circumvent an unpopular
invalidation of its ordinance, the judiciary must fashion affirmative
relief that thoughtfully considers the needs of the particular plain-
tiff, as well as those of the surrounding region.
CONCLUSION
Home rule provisions have been enacted so as to enable local
governments to act pursuant to the powers delegated to them by
their respective states. This Note has suggested that in the area of
land use planning, a particular locality's exercise of such powers
must further the "regional general welfare" of the state from which
the powers emanate. Ideally, this standard would be imposed
through statewide land use legislation that mandates the adoption
of local comprehensive plans and provides for a substantive incor-
poration statute. In the absence of meaningful state legislation,
however, a local government that has developed a comprehensive
plan should not be forced to observe idly the undermining of its
rational and thorough planning through an attempt at defensive
incorporation by a number of its inhabitants. Thus, when a local
government utilizes a substantive incorporation statute to im-
plement its comprehensive plan, a reviewing court should uphold
recommended that the necessary variance be issued, the township council rejected the plain-
tiff's application. Id. Subsequent to the plaintiff's successful challenge of this denial, the
township amended the ordinance three times, thereby preventing the issuance of the vari-
ance and forcing the plaintiff to endure four trials involving 7 years of litigation. Id. at 443,
414 A.2d at 13. The court, noting that the township "had more than enough opportunity to
amend its ordinance," granted the plaintiff affirmative relief in the form of an order that a
variance be issued. Id. at 445, 414 A.2d at 14.
181 See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. at 552-53, 371
A.2d at 1228 (court recognized that zoning action, rather than continued theorizing, was
necessary to avoid abuse of municipal authority).
Compare Rose, Conflict Between Regionalism and Home Rule: The Ambivalence of
Recent Planning Law Decisions, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1977) (appropriate forum for
deciding conflicts between regionalism and local autonomy is the legislature) and Sandalow,
supra note 65, at 683 (courts have little competence to deal with governmental fragmenta-
tion and parochialism in land use planning) with Delogu, supra note 43, at 73-77 (courts
must assess reasonableness of local ordinances if exclusionary practices are to be prevented)
and Hartman, supra note 184, at 177 ("the judiciary must carry the remedial burden" un-
less or until the legislature acts).
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its validity as a necessary endeavor to promote regional interests
and curb both governmental fragmentation and parochial, ad hoc
planning.
Rosemary B. Boller
